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A primary aim of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is to expand access to
health insurance to small businesses and individuals. These groups
experience significant barriers to obtaining affordable insurance because they
are subject to discriminatory practices by insurers and lack the necessary
market power to negotiate reasonable premiums. While much attention has
been paid to the ACA's requirement for state exchanges through which these
groups will shop for insurance, and reforms of insurers' practices, less is
known about the ACA's provision for nonprofit, member-owned health
insurance cooperatives (or co-ops) that will operate inside these exchanges.
Cooperatives are limited in scope, but they have the potential to strengthen
the position and control of small firms and individuals in the health insurance
decisions.
In this article, I briefly sketch the insertion of cooperative provision in
the ACA, and note how this represented a compromise between progressive
and conservative Democrats in Congress. I then use Common Ground
Healthcare Cooperative (CGHC) as a case study to explore the political and
technical challenges facing the creation and implementation of cooperatives at
state level. Located in Wisconsin, CGHC is one of the first wave of co-ops to
receive federal funding under the ACA. I conclude with an assessment of the
possible impact that co-ops may have on the US health care system.

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 38, No. 3 (2013): pg. 599-610. DOI. This article is © Duke University Press
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Duke University Press.

1

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Problems of Affordability in the Small Group
and Individual Insurance Markets
Small firms and individuals face specific obstacles to finding
affordable health insurance that large employers do not. First, small
employers and individuals are subject to medical underwriting
practices that place insurance out of reach. These include the use of
experience rating to calculate premiums according to the expected or
actual health use of the customer, and exclusion waivers that specify
certain common health conditions from coverage. Perhaps the most
insidious practice is the preexisting condition clause, which absolves
insurers from current coverage of any medical condition that a client
had ― even if it went untreated or undetected ― in the year prior to
the start of the insurance policy (Stone 1993). Second and related to
medical underwriting, the administrative costs are much higher than
for a single policy that covers a large employer, and the premiums in
the small group and individual markets reflect such costs (Sered and
Femandopulle 2007: 114). Lastly, unlike a large firm, small businesses
and individuals seeking to purchase health insurance are too atomized
and too small to exert the necessary market power in negotiations
with a few large insurers.
Coverage figures attest to the difficulties that small firms and
individuals face. In 2012, only 35.7% of firms with fewer than 50
employees offered insurance, while 95.7% of firms with 50 or more
workers did so (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012a). Between 1999 and
2012, premiums for employer-based insurance rose from $5,791 to
$15,745 for family coverage (Employer Health Benefits 2012).
Whereas large firms must absorb single-digit annual increases in
premiums, small firms and individuals routinely face double-digit
annual rate hikes of 30% or more (Jacobs and Skocpol 2010: 111;
Jagler 2012: 21).

Cooperatives under the ACA
To rectify these problems, the ACA requires that each state
create a health insurance marketplace, or exchange, through which
small businesses with fewer than 100 employees and individuals can
choose among competing insurers. All insurance companies must offer
minimum levels of coverage and must market their products in easily
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comparable and understandable formats. The law also provides
subsidies for persons with incomes up to 400 percent of the federal
poverty line and tax credits for firms with fewer than 25 full-time
employees that opt to offer insurance. The ACA also requires insurers
in the exchanges to use modified community rating instead of
experience rating. All insurers will have to accept any client regardless
of health status. The ACA also inserted a provision for the creation of a
nonprofit insurance cooperative in each exchange
(www.healthcare.gov; Kaiser Family Foundation 2012b).
A cooperative is a mutual self-help organization whose members
join together to enhance their market power. They are membergoverned, and if nonprofit, must invest surpluses into the services and
operations of the organization (Richardson 2011). Rural health care
cooperatives sprang up during the New Deal, but most were shortlived (Jost 2011; Richardson 2011).
The ACA gave cooperatives a new lease on life and constituted a
compromise between progressive and conservative Democrats in
Congress on the terms of health care reform. Many progressives
advocated a single-payer health insurance system like Canada's, or
"Medicare for all." But moderates saw it as politically infeasible, as a
government takeover of health care that would vastly expand federal
and state budgets obligations. Other reformers proposed a public
option as a middle way. The public option would have preserved
existing employment-based insurance while permitting a government
health plan to compete alongside private insurers in the small group
and individual exchanges (Hacker 2008). House Democrats inserted a
watered-down public option in their reform bill, but Senate Democrats
refused to follow suit. Conservatives within the Democratic caucus in
the Senate had more leverage than their House counterparts, and the
rules of debate posed a real possibility that reform bill might not reach
a vote on the Senate floor. For conservative Senate Democrats and
private insurers, the public option was still too much government
(Jacobs and Skocpol 2010: 59-64).2 Senator Kent Conrad (D-ND)
offered a way forward with his proposal for cooperatives as a
bipartisan solution (Conrad 2009; Gardner 2009; Weisman 2009).
Conrad maintained that nonprofit, member-governed co-ops with a
strong consumer focus could appease advocates of a public option,
while co-ops run by and for small businesses and operating at state
level could assuage the fears of those concerned with a government
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takeover of health care (Weisman 2009). While failing to achieve
bipartisan agreement, cooperatives became part of the Senate bill and
the final ACA.
Section 1322 of the Affordable Care Act created the Consumer
Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) program, and provides up to $3.8
billion in federal loans to help cover the start-up costs of nonprofit,
member-owned and operated health insurance companies in each
state exchange. According to the law, each cooperative must be
governed by its members, have a strong consumer focus, and reinvest
any profits into the organization in order to improve benefits or health
care delivery, or lower premiums. To ensure that co-ops are truly
representative of small businesses and individuals, the ACA bars
existing health insurance companies and state or local governments
from creating such entities (Kaiser Family Foundation 2012b: 4).

The Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative
(CGHC)
Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative (CGHC) was among
the first wave of co-ops to receive federal funding in February 2012. It
was established by Common Ground, an organization of religious
congregations, neighborhood associations, and schools working to
achieve positive social change in southeastern Wisconsin. Common
Ground, in tum, is an affiliate of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF)
community organizing network. Though established by Common
Ground, the co-op is a separate legal entity with its own management
and board of directors (Common Ground; CGHC 2012).
The creation of CGHC is a story of perseverance and a
willingness to adjust to new circumstances. The effort began in 2007
when Common Ground leaders consulted their member organizations
and learned that affordable health insurance was one of their chief
concerns. Next, the leadership formed a health care team of Common
Ground members to research the issue and consider possible solutions.
In 2008, well before the election of Barack Obama, Common Ground's
membership decided to create a health insurance purchasing
cooperative for small businesses, self-employed individuals, and
nonprofits. During the next three years, the health care team
conducted informational meetings with over 200 small businesses and
individuals to gauge their interest in the idea and met with state
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officials and health care stakeholders to seek their support. The team
also sought state and federal seed money for the co-op, but the fiscal
strains associated with the 2008 recession closed off such possibilities.
The passage of the ACA opened a new door, however. The type
of co-op under the law was a nonprofit, member-owned insurance
company to be offered in the state exchanges for small businesses and
individuals. Accordingly, Common Ground abandoned its plans for an
insurance purchasing cooperative and instead worked to establish a
nonprofit health insurance company and seek federal funding under
the ACA. The CGHC submitted a loan application to the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) in the fall of2011 and was one of
seven co-ops to receive development loans from the federal
government in February 2012. The federal loans of up to $56.4 million
represent crucial assistance to CGHC to address the start-up costs it
faces in a mature health insurance market (Boulton 2012b). Following
the ACA's timetable, CGHC will begin enrolling members in October
2013, with coverage commencing on January 1, 2014. CGHC will offer
insurance to small businesses of 50 or fewer employees, nonprofits,
and individuals in seven southeastern Wisconsin counties (CGHC 2012;
Jagler 2012: 21).

Challenges to the CGHC
To succeed, co-ops must overcome political and technical
challenges. The political tasks include garnering federal funding and
designation, while winning support from policymakers at state level. In
Wisconsin, the political climate was initially favorable to Common
Ground's efforts to create a co-op. For most of 2008, the
administration of Democratic Governor Jim Doyle worked on its own
plan for an exchange, BadgerChoice, modeled on the Massachusetts
exchange. But the state's fiscal difficulties the following year required
Doyle to put the plan on hold (Business Journal 2008; Hess 2009;
Common Ground n.d.). Following the enactment of the ACA, the
federal government designated Wisconsin an early leader in developing
an exchange, and awarded the state $38 million to resume its work.
The political climate abruptly shifted following the midterm
elections in 2010. Republicans wrested majority control of the US
House of Representatives and vowed to block the implementation of
the ACA. In Wisconsin, Republicans swept both houses of the state
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legislature and the governorship from the Democrats. The new
governor, Scott Walker, championed the Tea Party ideology of small
government and low taxes. Health policy in Wisconsin was also
subsumed in the ferocious struggle over public employees' collective
bargaining rights in 2011-12. Walker prevailed in that battle, but the
matter poisoned the political climate and halted any meaningful
legislative activity until after the 2012 elections.
Governor Walker initially gave mixed signals on the direction of
his administration toward the ACA. In the name of small government
and state's rights, Wisconsin became one of26 states to file a lawsuit
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA before the US Supreme
Court. At the same time, however, Walker directed his administration
to continue work on the exchange under the aegis of the newly
created Office of Free Market Health Care (OFMHC 2011). In late
December 2011, however, the governor reversed course, halting work
on the exchange pending the Supreme Court ruling (Boulton 2012a),
and subsequently returning the $38 million in federal money that
Doyle had received for the exchange. According to Walker, '"Stopping
the encroachment of ObamaCare in our state, which has the potential
to have a devastating impact on Wisconsin's economy, is a top
priority"' (Stein 2012a). While Democratic legislators were more
receptive to Common Ground's bid for federal funding of the coop,
Republicans adopted a stance of calculated indifference and Walker
remained silent on the news that CGHC had secured the federal loan.3
The political climate has since become more settled in 2012. The
ACA's survival is assured with the Supreme Court's decision upholding
most of the ACA's provisions and President Obama's reelection in
November, and the Walker administration has since clarified its
position. On November 15, the governor announced that he would let
the federal government set up the exchange in Wisconsin. He justified
his decision by citing the potential cost to Wisconsin taxpayers to run a
state exchange and arguing that the state would have had little power
in setting its parameters. His stance sat well with the 20 Tea Party
organizations that had urged this course of action, but less so with the
state's business community and health care providers who had pushed
for a state-created exchange (Durhams et al. 2012; Stein and Boulton
2012).
Throughout the unsettled political climate, Common Ground
remained undaunted. The organization continued its work on the coJournal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 38, No. 3 (2013): pg. 599-610. DOI. This article is © Duke University Press
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op, and maintained that it could operate with or without an exchange.
For CGHC, the political saga had a positive outcome for its future
operations, since the insurance reforms will go forward and Wisconsin
will get an exchange.
There are still a number of significant technical challenges that
CGHC must confront. First, the co-op needs management and
administrative expertise in order to design benefit packages and
negotiate contracts with providers. CGHC is well positioned in this
regard, having hired a senior management team and administrative
staff with strong backgrounds in the health care industry. Its board of
directors includes experts in health care management alongside
consumer representatives. CGHC also got an early start by partnering
with firms with expertise in actuarial, benefits, and legal matters when
developing its loan application, and these entities continue to provide
assistance.4
Second, co-ops like CGHC face formidable barriers to market
entry (Gray 2011). They will be up against well-established, large
national insurers to offer products that are competitive on price and
quality. In addition, the ACA's prohibition on using federal loan money
for marketing purposes may place cooperatives at a disadvantage
relative to established insurers. This requires co-ops to be creative in
devising ways to get information on its products out to potential
members. For CGHC, this might include using foundation money for
marketing purposes and contracting with existing insurance brokers to
sell its products. The co-op might also find Common Ground member
organizations, and the small businesses and individuals that the health
care team has contacted in the past three years, to make up an
important source of its initial enrollment.
Adverse selection poses a significant challenge to the co-op's
survival, though the ACA might diminish this threat somewhat. The
ACA requires that two-thirds of co-op insurance policies be written for
the small businesses and individuals, which could mean the enrollment
of people who had previously been shut out of the insurance market
because of preexisting medical conditions. If CGHC fails to attract
enough healthy members to pool risks with sicker enrollees, it could go
bankrupt.5 However, the ACA contains important provisions to mitigate
this danger. The individual mandate should bring healthier members
into the exchange, and presumably the co-op will benefit from this.
The law's provisions for modified community rating and risk-adjusted
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payments among insurers in the exchanges should also moderate
premiums differences among insurance companies and compensate
the co-op if it enrolls less healthy members. Moreover, the bulk of the
federal loan money that CGHC received must go into its reserves to
pay out insurance claims, which could tide the co-op over during its
perilous formative period.
The co-op's size will also be critical to its success in negotiating
contracts with large, established provider systems. One estimate is
that insurers need 500,000 members to exert such leverage (Pear and
Harris 2009; Weisman 2009), something that small startups like CGHC
may not possess. But the ACA prohibits some forms of collaboration
among co-ops that could undermine their market power relative to
providers. While coops may form "private councils" with each other to
purchase and share claims processing and administrative services, the
ACA bars them from coordinating fee negotiations with providers in
order to avoid running afoul of antitrust law (Gray 2011: 3 ). This ban
rules out an "all-payer system" that would have given co-ops the
ability to negotiate lower uniform fee schedules with providers.
Still, co-ops like CGHC may be able to collaborate with providers
to promote affordable quality care. Providers are consolidating into
integrated delivery systems (IDSs) to survive and bolster their
marketing position relative to insurers (Devers et al. 2003). At the
same time, IDSs and their use of electronic medical records are an
opportunity for co-ops to negotiate new forms of coordinated care and
reimbursement, such as accountable care organizations and medical
homes, which could meet both cost and clinical effectiveness.
But if other insurers offer similar products, what might set coops apart from their rivals? In the end, cooperatives' distinctive rules
and governance structure could prove critical competitive advantages.
First, as a nonprofit, a co-op like CGHC must invest any surplus into
the organization to improve benefits and health care delivery, or to
lower premiums and expand enrollment. This means that unlike their
for-profit rivals, co-ops are unencumbered by the need to distribute its
profits to shareholders as dividends or pay exorbitant salaries to
CEOs.6 This gives co-ops like CGHC a longer time horizon in which to
operate, particularly if it can enroll members for three years rather
than one. The co-op model is one based mutual assistance, trust, and
shared commitment. Such "social capital" (Putnam 2000) is lacking in
faceless national insurers. Moreover, because it is member-owned and
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol 38, No. 3 (2013): pg. 599-610. DOI. This article is © Duke University Press
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Duke University Press does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Duke University Press.

8

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

governed, CGHC can offer clients transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness that a national commercial insurer cannot. CGHC
members will have a direct say on its strategic decisions through their
presence on the board of directors, and will have access to its financial
records. Since the co-op is "us" and not "them, it should be expected
to tailor insurance products that meet the needs of small businesses
and offer personalized service that a distant insurance carrier may not
be able to provide.7
Most important, the co-op offers small firms and individuals the
possibility of exerting genuine market power in the market for health
insurance and health care for the first time. By banding together as a
single insurance company, previously powerless individuals and small
businesses may finally have the clout to negotiate competitive
contracts with providers directly. There is no assurance that exchanges
in and of themselves will provide this. To be sure, exchanges will
structure the competition and set rules so that insurers will have to
compete fairly and transparently for customers. But if those customers
remain puny and atomized, insurers might still treat them with
disdain. But if individuals and small firms become the insurance
company-and become a large enough one-they will be able to free
themselves from servitude to insurance middlemen and be a size that
providers will have to reckon with.

Conclusion
Given their restrictive design under the ACA, co-operatives are
unlikely to fundamentally transform the US health care system in ways
that progressive forces had hoped. Nevertheless, co-ops could reshape
the local or regional markets in which they will operate. If successful,
they will empower small businesses and individuals and offer them
democratic, responsive health care experiences. For these groups too
long disdained by commercial insurers, this would represent
meaningful, positive change.

Notes:
1

2

The author is a member of the Common Ground health care team and
previously served on the board of directors of CGHC.
A filibuster allows unlimited debate on a bill on the Senate floor, unless at
least 60 senators move to end debate and take a vote on a bill.
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3

4

5

6

7

Democratic leaders in the Senate did not believe they had the requisite
supermajority to overcome such a filibuster.
Common Ground failed to secure letters of support from politicians of either
party to include with its loan application for the co-op. Staffers of
Democratic Congresswoman Gwen Moore, Senator Herb Kohl, and
state Senator Jon Richards met with Common Ground and expressed
their support for the co-op, but Republican Senator Ron Johnson,
Representatives Paul Ryan and Jim Sensenbrenner, and state Senator
Leah Vukmir rebuffed requests by Common Ground for meetings in
2011.
These included Milliman, Benefits Services Group, Quarles and Brady law
firm, and assistance and advice from the National Association of State
Health Co-Ops (NASHCO).
According to expert testimony before the Consumer Operated and Oriented
Health Plans advisory board and from a consultant who assisted
Senate staff in drafting the ACA, an insurer needs 25,000 members or
5% of the market to effectively counter adverse selection (Gray 20 II:
6, 8, n. I 7; Pear and Harris 2009; Weisman 2009).
Most for-profit insurers spend only 80% or 85% of premiums on direct
medical care, with the rest going to administrative costs, marketing,
and salaries (Reid 2009, 20 I 0: 37). Bob Connolly, CGHC's president,
admits that the CEO will be paid a competitive salary, but says it will
be below the $50 million remuneration typical ofCEOs offor-profit
insurers (Jagler, 2012: 21).
CGHC CEO Cathy Mahaffey notes that most small employers do not have the
resources to create their own health promotion and prevention
programs for their workers, but that the co-op could involve its
members in decisions on benefits designs that meet their particular
needs (Jagler 2012: 22).
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